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ABSTRACT
Militant Islamist ideology and the level of attention and reaction it merits from the United
States government has been the point of much contention and debate within both the
academic and policy communities. The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the relevance
of militant Islamist ideology in crafting and implementing the emerging United States
policy of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Militant Islamist ideology provides its
adherents with a strong sense of identity, motivation towards a seemingly worthy cause,
and an all-encompassing and simplistic worldview. This ultimately points to the
importance of engaging with the Muslim community, careful and tactful use of law
enforcement, and efforts to minimize Islamophobia in the implementation of the U.S.
CVE policy. Chapter One provides a brief overview of militant Islamist ideology, with
particular emphasis on how it facilitates identity and what that means in a broader, sociopsychological sense. Chapter Two describes existing CVE programs in the United
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the emerging programs in the U.S as well as the challenges
recognized by each program. These programs are then assessed according to the lessons
learned in Chapter One in order to advise ways in which U.S. CVE policy can effectively
address militant Islamist ideology. To date, there is little certain or validated about how to
effectively carry out these programs, due to the fact that they are all the first of their kind.
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INTRODUCTION

Militant Islamist ideology and the level of attention and reaction it merits from the
United States government has been the point of much contention and debate within both
the academic and policy communities. The purpose of this thesis is to address the
question of whether or not militant Islamist ideology ‘matters’ and posit what that means
for the emerging United States Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy. In doing so,
this thesis will argue that militant Islamist ideology does ‘matter’ because it provides its
adherents with a strong sense of identity, motivation towards a seemingly worthy cause,
and an all-encompassing and simplistic worldview. For the emerging U.S. policy in CVE,
this hypothesis ultimately points to the importance of engaging the Muslim community,
the civil and carefully calculated use of law enforcement, and efforts to minimize
Islamophobia. Chapter One provides a brief overview of militant Islamist ideology, with
particular emphasis on how it facilitates identity and what that means in a broader, sociopsychological sense. Chapter Two describes the existing CVE programs in the United
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the emerging programs in the U.S, including some
challenges recognized by each program. These programs are then assessed according to
the lessons learned in Chapter One in order to advise ways in which U.S. CVE policy can
effectively address militant Islamist ideology. The U.S. CVE policy is in its infancy, with
only three pilot programs having been established, and as it moves forward it is important
to do so with informed and tactful precision; this thesis aims to provide useful insight and
suggestions in that forward movement.

1

The policy initiative of CVE emerged as a result of the realization that military
operations alone will not defeat the terrorism we face today and as part of the wider
strategic objective of countering terrorism by going beyond military measures to address
the underlying roots of terrorism.1 A flurry of research projects have sought to explore
and prove what is at the root of terrorism in order to foster an appropriate policy response
that sufficiently addresses it. The contestants for the root causes ranges from social,
economic, political, and religious factors, or any combination thereof. As such, CVE
programs have responded in kind, utilizing social, economic, political, and historical
contexts in order to holistically address the instances in which violence can arise.
Generally speaking, CVE aims to produce counter narratives that challenge extremist and
violent extremist messages using a wide range of activities such as public diplomacy,
social and educational outreach programs, and targeted government campaigns.
Furthermore, approaches to CVE also aim to combine hard and soft powers.2
Multiple CVE programs have been developed and implemented across the world,
and although some programs are more mature than others, such as the UK and Saudi
Arabia programs mentioned here, they are all the first of their kind. CVE programs
generally recognize that there are multiple underlying causes, although the degree to
which each program favors one cause over the others, as well as the types of responses it
implements to address them, differs from program to program. Such ambiguity in
approach is largely due to the fact that this is uncharted territory—there is no solid
1

Diane DiEuliis, “Preface,” In “Countering Violence Extremism Scientific Methods &
Strategies,” 9, edited by Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research
Laboratory, 2011.
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Australian Government Department of Defence, Defence Science and Teachonology
Organisation, “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” by Minerva
Nasser Eddine et al, DSTO TR 2522 (Edinburgh, South Australia), 18.
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evidence, neither in research nor in practice, of how to successfully implement such
programs.3 4 As such, those tasked with crafting CVE programs are faced with many
challenges, including deciding what proposed causes to address and how, how to
effectively measure the success of the programs, and how to accurately identify and
target the appropriate individuals and communities.5 This thesis argues that, as one of the
proposed underlying causes, ideology should not be dismissed, as some would argue, but
rather carefully considered.
Much of the debate surrounding whether or not militant Islamist ideology is a
cause of Islamist terrorism, and therefore is or is not relevant to crafting CVE policy, is
concerned with what militant Islamist ideology is and where it came from. Because
militant Islamist ideology is religiously based, this has led to a heated back-and-forth
regarding the amount of blame the religion of Islam deserves for producing the ideology.6
Those fixated on the fact that militant Islamist ideology is religiously based often propose
that it must be challenged on its own religious terms in order to be defeated.7 However,
this thesis argues that it is not militant Islamist ideology itself that needs to be focused on,
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Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies,” 7, edited by Laurie Fenstermacher and
Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research Laboratory, 2011.
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Emman el-Badawy et al, “Inside the Jihadi Mind,” Centre on Religion & Politics, The
Tony Blair Foundation, 2015, p. 4.
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but rather what militant Islamist ideology provides its adherents.8 Although there is room
for the argument that militant Islamist ideology needs to be confronted on a religious
level, such a task is best left to the Muslim community and its clerics; the U.S. is not
equipped, legally or theologically, to challenge militant Islamist ideology and its leaders.9
Instead, by looking at what militant Islamist ideology provides its adherents, which this
thesis identifies to be a strong sense of self-identity and purpose, policy makers can work
to develop alternative, non-violent means by which similar notions can be achieved.
A large part of CVE-related activities and programs is raising awareness of the
process of radicalization and how to recognize symptoms of this process.10 Radicalization
can be referred to as the process by which individuals develop extreme views, which may
or may not include a turn towards violence.11 It should be noted that there are multiple
stages of what has been called the radicalization process toward militant action, as will be
demonstrated by the various CVE programs described in Chapter Two.12 Although there
is no agreed-upon-exact process, the existence of multiple stages is generally accepted
among scholars. Essentially, there are the beginning, middle, and end stages, each of
which merit a different response; someone who displays passive sympathy towards
8
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No. 4 (December 2006): 462.
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radical Islamist ideas should not be imprisoned in the way that someone actively
supporting those ideas would.13 Instead, it is believed, that those in the ‘beginning’ stages
of radicalization warrant more of a social response rather than a law enforcement one.
Considering this, this thesis is primarily concerned with the ‘beginning’ stages of
radicalization, in which the ideas and sentiments of the Islamist ideology are about to or
have recently taken root in an individual. This focus on the beginning stages is due to the
fact that the U.S. is not currently faced with fully radicalized communities that actively
support Islamist terrorism, such as with communities in the UK, but rather with the task
of preventing that situation entirely.14 As such, this thesis is concerned with arguing for
the importance of militant Islamist ideology in formulating an effective CVE policy such
that the radicalization of communities, and thereby acts of Islamist terrorism, are
successfully prevented.
Concerning ideology, despite much discourse over its definition and for the sake
of brevity, this thesis regards ideology to be a set of ideas that make up and legitimize the
beliefs, goals, and motivations of an individual or group.15 In this particular case, the
ideology being discussed happens to be religiously based; however, many ideologies are
not. The term ‘militant Islamist ideology’ has been purposefully selected over other
variations that include the terms ‘Islamic’ and various renditions of ‘jihad’ such as
‘radical Islamic ideology’ or ‘jihadist ideology’; this choice has been made to convey the
distinction between the religion of Islam and militant Islamist ideology and the classic,
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Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies,” 52.
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Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso Books, 2007).
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linguistic definitions of jihad versus the ideology’s definition of jihad. The ideology in
question only bears a portion of the concepts in the religion of Islam and therefore cannot
be accurately described as ‘Islamic;’16 therefore, ‘Islamist’ is used in reference to those
who believe in and support political Islam. The modifier ‘militant’ is used to specify
those Islamists who tend to use violence as a means to achieve their goals. This violence
is often referred to as ‘jihad;’ however, as militant Islamist ideology only represents a
portion of the religion, the ideology’s use of ‘jihad’ only represents part of the concept of
jihad.17 Further discussion on this matter is placed in Appendix A.
Furthermore, in discussing the arguments for and against the significance of
ideology, there are occasions in which the words ‘religion’ and ‘ideology’ are used
interchangeably. This may be confusing given the just-mentioned effort to separate the
religion of Islam from militant Islamist ideology; however, in the instances where
‘religion’ is used in place of ‘ideology,’ it is used in reference to religion as a general
concept, rather than the specific religion of Islam. As a general concept, religion can
serve as a pre-established set of ideas that can be used to create an ideology, or as an
ideology. Thus, the desired distinction between Islam and militant Islamist ideology is
maintained; however, a connection between the general concept of religion and ideology
is recognized.

16

Indeed, what exactly can be deemed ‘Islamic’ is debatable in many instances, as the
Muslim community does not have an authoritative body to make such decisions such as
the Papacy in Catholicism.
17
Maher Hathout, Jihad vs. Terrorism, (Los Angeles: Multimedia Vera International),
17-20.
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CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSING THE RELEVANCE OF MILITANT
ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY

This chapter will briefly delineate militant Islamist ideology and its sources in
order to make the argument that the ideology does matter and explain why. This is a topic
of much contention in both the policy and academic communities. There are those who
argue that Islamist terrorism is simply the most recent strain of ideological terrorism and
other socio-political factors matter more; then, there are those who argue militant Islamist
ideology matters because of its religious nature, causing its adherents to be particularly
violent because they believe they are divinely sanctioned to do so. Both sides of the
argument are compelling, well sourced, and likely correct in their own ways; however,
after delineating both arguments, the case will be made that is important to consider when
crafting CVE policy, but not because it is religious, or Islamic, in nature, but because, as
an ideology, it provides its potential and current members with a strong sense of identity,
a cause to believe in and fight for, and a simple explanation and solution for all that is
wrong in the world—all of which can be difficult to find and obtain in an ever globalized
and technological world. As such, understanding this ideology is crucial, not just for the
sake of understanding it, but also for the sake of understanding what its adherents believe
they are obtaining in order to find and provide alternative, non-violent methods to
achieve similar concepts and stem the tide of Islamist terrorism.

7

Overview of Militant Islamist Ideology
In the aftermath of 9/11, Americans were reeling trying to understand what
reasons those men had for killing three thousand innocent civilians in a seemingly
unprovoked attack. “The list of explanations offered by analysts and scholars was long
and varied—U.S. policies in the Middle East (most especially America’s support for
Israel), U.S. arrogance, imperialism (cultural, political, and economic), and the poverty
and oppression endemic in many Arab countries were all blamed as the root causes for
the attacks,” other explanations turned to the simple existence of the United States and its
characteristics—the freedoms, democracy, power, and wealth of the United States—as
reason for the attacks. However valid and relevant any of these explanations may be, the
only explanation that’s worth understanding when seeking to counter it, is the
explanation provided by the assailants themselves.18 Thus, the following section will
briefly provide an overview of that explanation, as explained and viewed by the
assailants.
While it is arguably incorrect to equate terrorism with Islam, it would also be
incorrect to say Islam has nothing to do with the militant Islamist movement;19 through a
largely selective process, Islam provides the militant Islamist movement with seemingly
valid religious ammunition from which it builds its ideological arsenal. As the analogy
suggests, the ideology’s developers and advocates only select the pieces of Islam that are
conducive to their desired strategy of peace through warmongering; “the jihadis play fast
and loose with both historical fact and traditional religious interpretation, in order to

18

Mary R Habeck,. Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 3.
19
Ibid., 3.
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understand their past as they believe it must be understood,” and “to justify whatever
actions they wish.”20 Through this selective process, they have created, and continue to
perpetuate, a neatly packed ideology that explains all of history, the future, and the
answers to their perceived ailments, which justifies their violence. In a nutshell, militant
Islamist ideology calls for the relentless pursuit of divinely sanctioned violence in order
to dislodge Western civilization as leader of the world and right all the wrongs it has
caused; namely the demise of a peaceful and just Islamic society for the sake of the
democratic, capitalistic, and godless rule of men.21
A fundamental concept to understand and accept, for the sake of argument, is that
the ultimate goal of militant Islamists is peace. Recognizing and temporarily accepting
this notion will open the doors to truly understanding militant Islamist ideology and its
appeal. The catch here, of course, is that the notion of peace is subjective; what peace
means to one entity may be the complete opposite of what it means for another. For the
purposes of understanding the current issue at hand, it must be fundamentally declared
that peace, in the mind of militant Islamists, is universal acceptance of Islam, and more
specifically, the creation of an Islamic world. Thus, the militant Islamist way of war is
actually, in their eyes, the way to peace.
Reliance on Divine Sources. Militant Islamists base their ideology and
methods of warfare on the divine sources of Islam—the Quran, hadith, and
sunna.22 As described by Pakistani General S.K. Malik, the Quran is a complete,
perfect, and heavenly revelation sent down by God that is “an unlimited reservoir
20

Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, 7-8; 53.
Ibid.
22
While it may seem that parts of this section are an exegesis of Islam and its sources,
such explanations are necessary in order to understand the issue at hand.
21
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of knowledge, wisdom, science, logic, light and guidance for mankind till
Eternity;” it is “perpetual and never-ending and free from all forms of mutilations,
modifications, additions and subtractions.”23 Mary Habeck, Adjunct Professor of
Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University, extensively explains militant
Islamist ideology (though she refers to it as jihadist ideology) and its foundations
as viewed by its adherents in her book Knowing the Enemy. While many of the
concepts she explains are universally accepted by all Muslims, she focuses on
how militant Islamists use those concepts to pursue their militant and political
agendas. Regarding the sources of Islam, she states, “because the sacred texts are
unchanging—and unchangeable—Islam, the Shari’a, and, by extension, jihadist
ideology, can never be altered.” 24 Essentially, at any point in time, the tenets of
Islam will always be the same and will always stand true, unlike secular codes of
law that allow for amendments and abolishment.
Habeck explains that the Quran and its message are also believed to be universal.
“Islamic jurists believe that the Torah and Gospels were sent down for a particular people
at a particular time, while the Quran is for all of humanity throughout all of time.”25 This
is why Muhammad was sent as the last prophet, or the seal of the prophets; “that
Muhammad was the last prophet means as well that there will be no more divine
revelation to alter or adapt Islam to fit in the modern world. It is, rather, the world that
must be changed to reflect the Quran.”26 Sayyid Qutb, one of the pioneers and most
renowned militant Islamist theorists, describes this notion in saying, “According to the
23

S. K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War. (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1979), 4-5.
Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 3.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
24
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Islamic concept, the whole universe has been created by God. The universe came into
existence when God willed it, and then he ordained certain natural laws that it follows
and according to which all its various parts operate harmoniously.”27
Altogether, the sources of Islam, and Islam itself, are seen as divine, perfect,
unchanging, and universal. While most, if not all, Muslims would likely agree with these
notions to one degree or another, the selective approach taken by the militant Islamists
regarding these notions creates far-reaching and violent implications for their ideology
and actions. First, because Islam is universal and unchanging, that means its stories and
lessons are seen as archetypes that are applicable in every instance––past, present, and
future––in every part of the world; “the stories, individuals, and nations described in the
Quran are archetypes that express eternal truths about the nature of good and evil,” and
“within the Quran are the secrets of the future as well as the past and its pages hold the
knowledge necessary to understand the plans and intentions of the Muslims’ enemies.”28
For example, the stories of battle victories in the ancient past “foretell the victory
of the ummah and the final defeat of the unbelievers.”29 Two specific archetypes often
used by militant Islamists in such fashion are the stories of the Battle of Badr and the
Battle of the Trench. The former was the first victory of Muhammad and the Muslims
against unbelievers and the latter was a battle in which severely outnumbered Muslim
forces held out against their enemies; both of which, in the eyes of the militant Islamists,
convey the message that victory is promised to Muslims so long as they have faith in

27

Jim Lacey, The Canons of Jihad: Terrorist's Strategy for Defeating America.
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 26.
28
Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 3.
29
Ibid.
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God, persevere through hardship and persecution, and fight the unbelievers if
outnumbered.30 Another example, regarding foretelling the intentions of enemies:
A jihadist sheikh, discussing the reaction to September 11, especially the
war in Afghanistan and reports that the U.S. government was considering
an attack on Arabia, said in an interview, “Many analysts and observers
inside and outside America were astonished by the ridiculous
justifications…However one group of observers was actually not
surprised. This is the group of Islamic thinkers that examine the world
affairs and the international developments and events in light of the Holy
Quran…Fourteen centuries ago, Allah Most Great, revealed what is in
their hearts and warned us from becoming allies with them and He
assigned us to call them to the path of Allah and to perform Jihad against
them and not to take them as intimate friends and allies.31
Second, because Islam is all encompassing and the only way to find peace,
government by any other means other than Islam and its sacred sources, particularly by
man, is unjust and seen as slavery. This implication stems from the first and most
important tenet of Islam, tawhid, or the unity of God. This tenet is clearly portrayed by
the shahada, which is the creed uttered by every Muslim that marks the beginning of
their faith. This declaration of faith says, “there is no God but God, and Muhammad is
the prophet of God.” This forms the basis of Islamic thinking in stating that there is no
other supreme entity other than God. “Militant Islamists have redefined this central belief
and given it an all-embracing significance.”32
Firstly, the unity and supremacy of God means that he is the only being who
deserves worship, and thus, he is the sole ruler of the world. Qutb said, “people should
devote their entire lives in submission to God, should not decide any affair on their own,

30

Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 3.
Ibid.
32
Ibid., Chapter 4.
31
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but must refer to God’s injunctions concerning it and follow them.”33 However, as
Habeck explains, this proper relationship between humanity and the divine has been
overturned by the dominion of man over man. Given this, Qutb contends, “any system in
which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the sources of all
authority are human, defiles human beings by designating others than God as lords over
men…Those who have usurped the authority of God…are oppressing God’s creatures,”
and “we reject them all, as indeed they are retrogressive and in opposition to the direction
toward which Islam intends to take mankind.”34 This, of course, is the modern state of
world affairs and, in the eyes of militant Islamists such as Sayyid abul a’la Mawdudi,
another pioneer militant Islamist theorist, is the root-cause of all evil and mischief in the
world. As such, militant Islamists are wholeheartedly working to re-establish the
dominion of God on earth and abolish the dominion of man, which, therefore, is
synonymous with freeing mankind from its slavery to the rule of man.
Second, if tawhid means that only God is to be worshipped, then it also holds that
only his laws matter and only he has sovereignty. This means that no man has the right to
legislate any law, nor does he have the right to enforce any such laws; this right belongs
exclusively to God alone. “The only role left for nation’s ‘leaders’ is to implement God’s
laws.”35 This reasoning stands as the conceptual basis for militant Islamists’ aversion to
western democratic models of government, international law, and the United Nations.
The laws created and enforced by these institutions are seen as illegitimate because they
are manmade and deliberately exclude religion. Furthermore, this implication of tawhid

33
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also stands as reason for their opposition of modern economic models, namely capitalism.
There are two points of contention in the opposition of capitalism: one, the Quran
specifically forbids the use of usury, and so the widely-used practice of charging interest
is seen as a direct disregard of that rule, and two, “according to the jihadis, God is the
true owner of all property, and man is allowed to use it only when he does so in an
Islamic, correct way.”36 Such far reaching and practical implications indicate just how
deeply consideration for tawhid goes in the mind of militant Islamists.
All of the implications above, each of which stem from the unchanging sources of
Islam, demonstrate how militant Islamists are of the conviction that they are working
towards peace and harmony; the establishment of an entirely Islamic world is seen as “a
sort of liberation theology, designed to end oppression by human institutions and manmade laws and to return God to his rightful place as unconditional ruler of the world.”37
As Qutb said, “the foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose jahiliyyah from the
leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the particular
way of life that is its permanent feature. The purpose of this rightly guided leadership is
the good and success of mankind.”38
Jihad. Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated the significance Islam and its
sources hold for militant Islamists; simple, basic beliefs have far-reaching implications
for seemingly unrelated matters. The religion represents an organized system that is
meant to touch all corners of the world and all aspects of life. Thus, the rise of the West
and its secular system of government was seen as a threat to the Islamic system,

36

Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 4.
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prompting theorists to turn to jihad, a Quranic concept from which the theorists crafted
their violent call to action as the means to defeat the threat of the West and reestablish
Islam to its rightful place.
The perceived threat began with the Crusader attacks of the Romans and
European Christian kings, has perpetuated through the British invasion of Muslim lands
until present day, and will continue until the ‘Crusader threat’ is either defeated by Islam
or successful in fully conquering and subjugating Muslims. This means that the various
events of conflict with non-believer entities are not viewed as separate, individual wars
but rather they are all, in the eyes of militant Islamists, a part of the same war that started
with the Crusades. This centuries-long war has resulted in the establishment of secular
schools in Islamic lands, the replacement of God’s laws with laws of humans, apostate
rulers, and the installation of money and business institutions that utilize forbidden
methods of usury and banking filled with trickery and corruption. It has further resulted
in a Muslim population in which the majority of them possess only, what former senior
al-Qaeda official Abu Firas al-Suri calls, a superficial form of the religion; he claimed the
Muslim population had forgotten God and instead, “America and the West, their culture
and ideas, have become the god of the times, worshipped, sanctified, and believed in by
the people more than they worship God…And there is no longer among them any
association to the people of Islam except by name and by adhering to a few traditions
with religious roots.” 39
This sentiment has been echoed through various Islamist theorists in various parts
of the world. While Syrian-born al-Suri’s The Call to Global Islamic Resistance was
39

Jim Lacey, A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab Al-Suri's
Islamic Jihad Manifesto, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 33.
15

published in more recent years, the same rhetoric can be found decades ago in Egyptborn Hassan al Banna’s Jihad. In it al-Banna says, “the Muslim world today is faced with
tyranny and injustice,” and explains that the love of wealth, the wish for glory, and
conquering using unjust methods are forbidden to Muslims.”40 He goes on to say, “it is
essential for mankind to have new leadership! The leadership of mankind by Western
man is now on the decline…because it is deprived of those life-giving values that enabled
it to be the leader of mankind. Islam is the only system that possesses these values and
this way of life.” 41 He, and other militant Islamist writers, called for a rising up of the
Muslim community in order to take back leadership of the world. For example, Qutb
said, “it is necessary to revive that Muslim community that is buried under the debris of
the manmade traditions of several generations and is crushed under the weight of those
false laws and customs that are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings, and
that, in spite of all this, calls itself the ‘world of Islam’.”42
Qutb recognized, however, that it would be impossible for the Muslim community
to compete with the West in material and scientific productions in such a way that would
make the world bow its head to them. So instead, he explains they must have something
more to offer other than material progress, which he determined is their faith, which has
the ability to fulfill “the basic human needs on the same level of excellence as technology
has fulfilled them in the sphere of material comfort.43 He predicted, though, “those who
have usurped the authority of God and are oppressing God’s creatures are not going to
give up their power merely through preaching,” because if that were the case, it would
40
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have already been done. Thus, he, among others, calls for a vanguard that will march
through the vast ocean of ignorance that has encompassed the entire world and fight in
the name of God to re-establish the rule of Islam, which again, is seen as peace and
freedom from servitude.
Similarly, al-Banna explains, “Islam is concerned with the question of jihad and
the mobilization of the entire ummah into one body to defend the cause with all its
strength.”44 He also claims that the Quran and the Sunnah of Muhammad are filled with
verses that summon the people “to jihad, to warfare, to the armed forces, and to all means
of land and sea fighting.”45 He assures his reader that anyone who reads the Quran and
pays attention to its true meaning will clearly see the call to arms; “clarifications are not
required.”46 Most notably, al-Banna argues that the verses of the Quran associate warfare
with prayer and fasting, “establishing it as one of the pillars of Islam.”47 It should be
noted that this is a clear example of the manipulation of the Quran in order to support the
profoundness of jihad. Though not actually one of the pillars of the faith, al-Banna
managed to present jihad in a way that makes it seem as if it is just as important.
Examples of this can be seen throughout various texts, indicating just how much jihad
means to these men, so much so that they distort the one source they hold to be purest on
earth. 48
The significance placed on offensive jihad makes for a violent ideology that has
specific implications for tactics in warfare, such as what to target and how to handle
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treaties. Theorists such as Pakistani General S. K. Malik and Majid Khadduri, founder of
the Middle East Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University, have dedicated works to
codifying sort of an Islamic equivalent of just war theory in order to ‘wage jihad’
effectively and according to Islamic principles. According to Malik, the Quranic maxims
on the conduct of war are: the art of decision making, the supremacy of the aim, selection
of objectives, constant striving and struggling, comparative evaluation of situation,
domination and aggressiveness, will and determination, patience and perseverance,
firmness and steadfastness, sacrifice, unity of thought and action, security and
precautions, discipline and obedience, and prayer. Therefore, while the methods of
warfare used by militant Islamists may seem erratic and illogical, they are actually
strategic realizations of their deep-seeded beliefs in their interpretation of Islam and
jihad.
Most importantly, because the goal of militant Islamists is a world dominated by
Islamic rule, the purpose of warfare is not victory or glory in any given battle, but rather
to fight in the name of God and to advance towards their goal of an Islamic world. This
means they are thinking in long-term goals. This also means that they will keep fighting
until they either achieve success or are somehow neutralized. For the West, this means
that no matter how large of an operation is launched against them, no matter how many
of them are killed, as long as militant Islamist ideology exists, it is likely that the militant
Islamist campaign will continue. As one scholar put it, “firing cruise missiles at select
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targets is like using half a dose of antibiotics to treat an infection—the infection is not
cured, but resistant strains of bacteria arise.”49
Regarding Malik’s maxims of Quranic warfare, the maxim of selection of
objective draws from the Battle of Badr in which the Quran issued instructions to the
Muslims regarding the selection of their objectives. The Quran says, “smite ye above
their necks, and smite all their fingertips off them.” Malik explains that this was said in
order to direct Muslims towards the most sensitive parts of the body. Thus, it is
prescribed that effort should be put forth to strike the most sensitive and vulnerable points
of the enemy. This includes choosing targets that will deprive the enemy of its ability to
fight back.
The sacrifice maxim is based off of the Quranic perspective that supreme
achievement lies in supreme sacrifice, which can be in the form of bearing suffering,
hunger, fatigue and death. However, it must be motivated by a selfless spirit. “The reward
of sacrifice is a life of honor in this world and salvation in the hereafter.”50 Not only does
this legitimize the use of suicide attacks and martyrdom, but it also gives meaning to the
often bleak and harsh lifestyle of a soldier.51
In terminating war, Khadduri explains, “the cessation of hostilities by a people
who had already been promised victory by God could only mean that Islam’s enemies
must capitulate at the end. For inherent in Islam is God’s power: failure would certainly
be on the side of its enemies since success could not be divorced from Islam. If the imam,
or his commanders in the field, found victory difficult to attain, he was advised to have
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continuous patience for the continuation of fighting until victory is achieved however
long it might take to reach at the end.”52 If there is a catastrophe a truce may be called
that will last no longer than the Hudaybiya treaty, which is 10 years. In cases of defeat,
“defeated Muslims always maintained that their battle with the enemy would be resumed,
however long they have to wait for the second round.”53
In the end, it can be said that militant Islamist ideology begins and ends with God
and the divine sources he handed down to man. Militant Islamists seek to bring back the
rule of Islam over Muslim lands and to extend it over the entire planet. The era when
Islam was the law of the land represents a time when the tenets of Islam were believed in
and actively practiced—all was, essentially, right in the world. Daily interactions and
dealings were carried out in accordance to God’s laws and the rulers of the land felt it
was their duty to uphold Gods laws on the earth. This era satisfied all of the major beliefs
of militant Islamists; God and his law were sovereign and supreme and Muslims ruled the
land. This society, however, was taken away from Muslims as the West began to rise and
continue its Crusader attack on the land of Islam. Thus, in response, militant Islamists
have used the divine sources given to them as a means to develop a strategy that is,
allegedly, in line with God’s ordained laws in order to fight, repel, and overcome the
enemy to once again achieve an Islamic world.
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Determining the Relevance of Militant Islamist Ideology
In the years leading up to and following 9/11, scholars and experts had been in the
process of defining a ‘new’ form of terrorism that focused on millennial visions of
apocalypse and mass casualties.54 The prominence of religion is a key, if not the main,
characteristic of ‘new’ terrorism as it is no longer focused on the conventional, political
goals that ‘old’ terrorism was. Many scholars allege the period between the late 1960’s
and 1980’s as the era of ‘old’ terrorism during which terrorism was often secular in
motivation, hierarchically organized, and discriminate in nature.55 Where exactly the
beginning of ‘new’ terrorism starts is difficult to pinpoint, though many point to the mid
1990’s, with the ’93 Trade Center and ’95 Aum Shinrikyo attacks, as the beginning.
‘New’ terrorism, as the argument goes, is marked by indiscriminate violence due to its
religious nature; “for the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty…executed in direct
response to some theological demand…and justified by scripture.”56 Additionally, ‘new’
terrorism is believed to typically be networked in structure and less hierarchical.57
Though each characteristic of ‘new’ terrorism has been categorically challenged, for the
purposes of this thesis, this section will focus on the characteristic of religiosity58 in order
to determine the relevance of militant Islamist ideology in crafting CVE policy.
Arguments demonstrating the irrelevance of militant Islamist ideology will first be
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presented followed by those that argue for its relevance. It should be noted that the
purpose of presenting arguments against the importance of ideology is not to propose
what matters more, but simply that ideology does not. Where proponents of new
terrorism identify religion as a key motivation and propellant of terrorism, those arguing
against a new terrorism insist that religion as a propellant of terrorism is not only nothing
new but also a nonissue.
Arguments Demonstrating the Irrelevance of Militant Islamist Ideology. In
her article “Old vs. New Terrorism” Martha Crenshaw tackles the notion posited by the
new terrorism perspective that the content of a particular ideology is a direct or
instigating cause of terrorism by systematically combing through each alleged
characteristic of new terrorism in order to argue that “religion is neither sufficient as an
explanation of the cause of the ‘new’ terrorism, in general, nor necessary as an
explanation of what does seem to be ‘new’ about terrorism.” She argues against each one,
except for the notion that terrorism has become more deadly over time, explaining that
“the only characteristic of new terrorism that is fundamentally impeachable is the
increasing lethality of terrorist action.”59 In general, Crenshaw argues, “what is typically
lacking in new terrorism advocacy is an explanation for why religion would have only
recently emerged as a cause of ‘new’ terrorism, given that religion has been a strong
force in human history since well before the ‘new’ terrorism arose. This fact suggests that
non-religious contextual factors play an important role in causing terrorism today.” 60
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Her argument goes on to say that even if and when religion appears to be an
instigating cause, it is only so in certain social and historical contexts. Neumann (2009)
explains this context to be structural change; religious identities form in reaction to the
influences of globalization and modernity as a solution to insecurity and loss of control,
or humiliation, in the face of rapid and confusing social and economic change. In a more
specific example, Hegghammer describes the emergence of the pan-Islamist ideology as
the construction of Muslim solidarity in the face of non-Muslim aggressors such as the
Soviet Union. As described in a comprehensive study of militant Islamist ideology, “in
the eyes of jihadis, deliverance from the perceived humiliation is so important because
this state of disgrace represents a direct attack against the faith itself. 61 In these cases, the
ideology was not the cause of the terrorism, but rather the means by which its adherents
responded to the actual cause; namely structural change and foreign invasion.62
Also assenting that ideology serves as an insufficient driver of terrorism, Rik
Coolsaet in Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism provides a comparative analysis of
contemporary Islamist terrorism by linking it to the notion of revolutionary terrorism in
order to shift the emphasis away from ideology and onto “the wider circumstances that
act as preconditions—factors that set the state for terrorism over the long run—for the
emergence of a specific variety of terrorism.”63 Revolutionary terrorism is defined by
Coolsaet as “a form of political behavior taken by groups and individuals in their attempt
to seize political power from established regimes, both domestic and global, that will
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result, if successful, in fundamental political and social change.”64 In his analysis, he
argues that Islamist terrorism is the most recent of four waves of revolutionary
terrorism—anarchist terrorism of the late 19th century, the separatist-fascist wave of the
1920’s and 1930’s, radical left wave in the late 1960’s, and finally the Islamist wave
starting in the 1990’s—though his analysis mostly focuses on comparison to the first
wave of anarchist terrorism.
The assassination of French President Sadi Carnot on June 24, 1894 was, as
explained by Coolsaet, to anarchist terrorism what 9/11 was to Islamist terrorism; it
marked the climax of a succession of anarchist attacks in France, and was among many
other attacks in various countries including Germany, Russia, and the United States.
These anarchists “strived for a just society where private property was abolished and
exploitation of men by men no longer existed. They were revolutionaries who believed
that in order to establish this utopian world, the old one had to be destroyed.”65 With the
invention of dynamite, the 1890’s became ‘the decade of the bomb,’ in which cities lived
in permanent fear of attacks where kings, presidents, and government buildings were
targeted as symbols of the arrogance of the ruling class. Across the board, the anarchists
“referred to social grief they deemed universal and to the injustice resulting from the
inequality between the privileged and the oppressed.”66
Since simultaneous attacks had taken place in several different countries, the
image of a well-run international movement was projected and believed, bringing the
term ‘international terrorism’ into fashion for the first time. However, Coolsaet argues,
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“the fact that attacks occurred in several countries at the same time had less to do with a
well-run international organization than with similar social contexts that acted as
breeding grounds, or preconditions, for groups and individuals to choose terrorism as
their preferred form of political action.”67 As a result of his comparative analysis,
Coolsaet argues that revolutionary terrorism, and therefore Islamist terrorism, is bred not
by poverty or ideology, but by generalized feelings of exclusion and marginalization. In
the late 19th century, people began to produce for export, the car was invented, as well as
film and aircraft; “thanks to globalization and progress in technology, communication
and transport, it became possible, for the first time in human history, to refer to a true
world market where goods, services, money and people moved back and forth, almost
without regard to national borders.”68 This new world, however, was only adjusted to by
some; “despised and feared, the worker was physically separated from the bourgeoisie
and pushed to the margins of society.” 69 Such marginalization, Coolsaet argues, is
caused by widespread and profound social and economic dislocation resulting from
globalization and rapid technological change.
In essence, radicalization leading to terrorism always begins with a sentiment of
injustice and moral outrage. “In the weltanschauung of the radicals of the 1990’s,
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the West in general and United States in
particular…convey the same image as the nineteenth-century bourgeois state did to the
contemporary anarchist terrorists: the symbol of the arrogance of power and thus the
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culprit for all that went wrong in the world.”70 Thus, according to Coolsaet’s reasoning,
today’s militant Islamists probably would have joined the anarchist terrorist movement,
as well as the radical left groups, and the separatist-fascist groups. “Neither anarchism as
political philosophy nor Islam as religion is at the origin of the process of political
radicalization drawing an individual into terrorist violence. It is the circumstances, which
make the terrorist….’It’s unfair’ has always proved to be a potent force in politics and a
prime mover for change. When people resent inequity, they are prone to radicalization. In
itself this is a highly moral attitude. But it becomes problematic from the moment it
moves into extremism, which eventually ends up luring some individuals into
terrorism.”71
Consequently, the argument, then, is not only that ideology is an insufficient
reason for radicalization, but also that the behavior of the Islamist terrorist movement is
not sui generis and is actually akin to earlier forms violent political movements. It is
unsurprising, then, that scholars of Social Movement Theory (SMT) have recently
incorporated Islamist movements into the theory, further demonstrating that ideology is
more of an accessory detail rather than a valid explanation. Quintan Wiktorowicz
mentions that, in actively searching for a new framework for understanding Islamic
contention, specialists on Islamic activism have begun exploring theoretical
developments that parallel trends in SMT. Though movements aren’t violent per se, the
lessons taught regarding them by SMT provide valuable insights into the radicalization
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process, which is ultimately the process officials are aiming to understand and prevent.72
In his book Islamic Activism, Wiktorowicz and co-authors demonstrate how the
dynamics, process, and organization of Islamic activism can be understood as important
elements of contention that transcend the specificity of “Islam” as a basis of collective
action.73
The arguments posed by Crenshaw and Coolsaet above are, whether or not they
are intended to be so, examples of early approaches to the study of social movements,
which were derived from functionalist social psychology accounts of mass behavior and
system equilibrium. In such accounts, system disequilibrium occurs when exogenous
structural strains produce grievances and “erode the efficacy of institutions, producing
pathological dysfunctions that can cause political instability. If institutional capacity
cannot accommodate newly mobilized societal demands, the result is social frustration
and political disorder.”74 As such, early SMT accounts posited a linear causal relationship
from structural strains, to psychological discomfort, to collective action. Examples of
structural strains included industrialization, modernization, and foreign invasion and
globalization. “Movements were thus seen as escapist mechanisms through which
individuals regain a sense of belonging and empowerment.”75 Given the history much of
the Islamic world has had with many of these so-called structural strains, early renditions
of SMT fit quite well in explaining the rise of Islamic movements and Islamist terrorist
movements.
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Given such an attractive causal relationship, there were those who questioned the
simplistic formula, which ultimately led to the rise of Resource Mobilization Theory
(RMT) as a new forefront of SMT. “Rather than viewing movements as constituted by
irrational or psychologically deprived individuals who join in response to structural
strains, RMT views movements as rational, organized manifestations of collective
action….Movements are not seen as irrational outbursts intended to alleviate
psychological distress, but rather as organized contention structured through mechanisms
of mobilization that provide strategic resources for sustained collective action.”76 RMT
arose in response to and to address anomalies in the structural strain model, including the
fact that structural strain and the distress it causes are ubiquitous, but movements are not.
“In fact, poor countries with limited resources or political freedom often produce few
social movements, despite the ubiquity of strain and discontent. Western democracies, on
the other hand, which enjoy much higher standards of living, political freedom, and
stability, are ripe with robust movements.”77 Early strain models also tended to disregard
the political and organized nature of movements; “movements are not merely
psychological coping mechanisms, they are often explicitly focused and directed toward
the political arena.”78 These anomalies meant that central questions about the emergence
of and dynamics of Islamic activism could not be addressed. For example, why do some
groups use violence while others eschew it, and under repressive conditions, how do
movements collectivize individual grievances and mobilize participants? RMT seeks to
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address these questions among others, fine tuning SMT where structural strain models
did not.
As the name indicates, RMT suggests the need for resources and mobilizing
structures in order to collectivize individual grievances and to bring money, support,
media attention, and alliances to the movement. Without these, movements will likely be
unable to truly get off the ground and become effective in producing desired change. The
mosque is an obvious mobilizing structure for Islamic activism, preaching and
disseminating religious messages as well as providing its members with a network, a vital
resource, which connects them across space. Other mobilizing structures include Islamic
NGOs and student organizations; such structures provide goods and services like medical
clinics, culture centers, and charities, which reinforce solidarity ties and demonstrate
examples of what Islam can provide in comparison to other non-Islamic structures. Such
examples are often used as leverage and proof for the claim that “Islam is the solution” to
all problems, physical and spiritual. “These organizations represent a friendly public face
that promotes the Islamic message without directly confronting the regime,” providing
and participating in activities that inadvertently “highlight the inability of the state to
effectively address socioeconomic problems.”79 Activists capture and usurp these
resources and structures to solidify the movement and further disseminate the
movement’s message.
The utility of these structures, other than of the raw services provided, lies in their
ability to articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with
potential participants and the public to elicit collective action. According to David Snow
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and Robert Benford, social movements utilize this ability, commonly referred to as
framing, in three ways; first, movements diagnose a condition as a problem that is in need
of redress, second, movements offer solutions to the problem including tactics and
strategies on how to achieve those solutions, and third, they provide rationale to motivate
support and collective action.80 The framing process will be most successful in the
instances where frame resonance is established; “the ability of a movement to transform a
mobilization potential into actual mobilization is contingent upon the capacity of a frame
to resonate with potential participants. Where a movement frame draws upon indigenous
cultural symbols, language, and identities, it is more likely to reverberate with
constituents, thus enhancing mobilization.”81 Islam is ripe with its own distinct culture, as
well as a rich and complicated history, both of which extend across multiple ethnicities
and countries, making frame resonance, and therefore collective mobilization, quite easy
to achieve.
If one focuses on the case of Islamic activism without the broader reference frame
of SMT, it’s reasonable to conceive that Islam is the ‘problem’. Indeed, all the elements
that are attributed by SMT as necessary and/or sufficient for the start and sustainment of
a movement are readily and easily provided by Islam; it provides multiple, wellestablished mobilizing structures that provide its members and the public vital resources
for the life of a movement such as networks, money, and media attention, and it serves as
a common historical background from which activists can build frame resonance.
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However, with the broader reference frame of SMT in mind, it’s clear that these elements
are consistent across all movements, such as the Civil and Gay Rights movements.
Considering this, it becomes evident that Islamic movements are simply another cut from
the same cloth, and that Islam and its affiliates (Islamism, jihadism, etc) are only the
means by which its adherents have responded to further underlying causes.
Arguments Supporting the Relevance of Militant Islamist Ideology.
Regardless of how compelling or valid the above arguments may be, there is no denying
that Islamist terrorism and its ideology do, at least superficially, stem from the religion of
Islam; “without the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives of ideology, its (Islamist
terrorism) methods and ends could neither be articulated nor legitimized in the eyes of its
sympathizers. 82 Essentially, without the religion, there would be no militant Islamist
ideology. It is this religiosity that leads many scholars, such as those advocating a ‘new
terrorism’ mentioned above, to be convinced of its importance. “Monotheistic faiths are
characterized by exclusive claims to valid identity and access to salvation. The violent
imagery embedded in their sacred texts… establish the legitimacy of killing as an act of
worship with redemptive qualities. In these narratives, the enemy must be eradicated, not
merely suppressed.” Islamist terrorism, and its other religiously motivated counterparts
including Christian and Jewish fundamentalism, are thus described to be distinctly
concerned with cosmic, moral values purported by the faith, which therefore makes it
more lethal and indiscriminate, arguably leaving few policy options for the United States.
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Although religious terrorism has been around for centuries (albeit not being called
terrorism in its earliest years), it has seen a distinct increase in existence and occurrence
in recent decades. According to Magnus Ranstorp, by 1996, the number of religious
fundamentalist movements had tripled since the mid-1960’s. 83 Similarly, according to
Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, only two out of 64 international terrorist groups in 1980
could be identified as religious, compared to 25 out of 58 in 1995. Although scholars of
religious terrorism recognize the contribution of non-religious elements towards its rise, it
is argued that they are more so predisposing factors rather than sufficient causes. Instead,
it is the groups’ religious, millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs that are seen as sufficient for
their existence and as reason for their excessively lethal nature.
In her discussion on why religious movements become violent, L. L. Dawson first
and foremost recognizes apocalyptic, religious beliefs, namely by the three Abrahamic
religions.
The refrains of apocalyptic rhetoric can be heard throughout history and the
world, though they are most pronounced in the three great religious traditions of
the West; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Each of these traditions rests on a core
of millennialist beliefs and expectations, expressed repeatedly in the prophecies
and perceived codes of their scriptures,” and “in times of particular social distress
and disorder, and even more under the influence of charismatic prophets, the
relatively passive popular response to apocalyptic beliefs can result in more
dangerous forms of social and even political activism.84
Millennialism refers to the fundamental eschatological belief that the end of time,
or apocalypse, is imminent, at which point God will judge the living and the dead and
bring peace on earth. Driven by such imminence, millenarian-apocalyptic believers are
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inclined to revolt against the sociopolitical order in an attempt to bring about the
promised kingdom of peace.85 As Richard Landes explains, apocalyptic millennial beliefs
have a significant direct impact on history because they call for active participation in
revolutionizing history.86 It is this millenarian-apocalypticness, particularly, that
ultimately distinguishes militant Islamist ideology and its other religiously motivated
terrorist counterparts from ‘traditional,’ politically driven terrorism.
Such religious millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs lead its violent perpetrators to
perceive themselves as unconstrained by the political, moral, and practical constraints of
the modern world; “believers are cosmic warriors in the battle with evil…no longer
bound by customary rules, no longer prisoners of conventional expectations…They live
in an enchanted and exciting world, and they want nothing more than to bring the rest of
us in it. Or, if we refuse, they will bring it to us.”87 As such, violence is a religious duty in
the war between good and evil, in which non-believers are dehumanized because they are
infidels or apostates. “When they look at humanity, many see not a wide and nuanced
spectrum of people, but a few saints and a vast sea of sinners, some redeemable, some
(most) not. They are quite clear on who will suffer punishment, and who will gain reward
at the final Revelation. And when they believe the moment has come, they do not believe
in compromise.”88 This disposition leads, almost naturally, to indiscriminate violence that
is markedly more lethal than political terrorism.

85

Britannica.com/topic/millennialism
Richard Allen Landes, Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 21.
87
Landes, Heaven on Earth, 16.
88
Ibid., 12.
86

33

Instances of such deadly and indiscriminate violence are not hard to find across
various religions. As Bruce Hoffman explains, examples can be found within militant
Christian white supremacists as well as in some radical Jewish messianic movements. 89
He refers to the indictment of 14 American white supremacists in 1987 for plotting to
poison municipal water supplies in two U.S. cities as well as the conviction of Israeli
fanatics in 1984 for plotting to blow up the Dome of the Rock. Hoffman also refers to the
violence perpetrated by Sikh’s in India against Hindu’s, albeit recognizing there is a lack
of millenarian-apocalyptic visions. The use of suicide attacks has also been argued as
another indication of the distinct lethality and indiscrimination of religious terrorism;
“whereas most action by ‘old’ terrorists involved an escape plan, ‘new’ terrorists seem
more willing to give their own life while orchestrating a terrorist attack…new terrorists
are more prepared to die because martyrdom is seen as a way of reaching heaven.”90
In regards to policy implications, some scholars have claimed that such
destructive and un-earthly inclinations leave few policy options for the U.S. Indeed, the
sentiment is, ‘what are we going to do in the face of such outlandish violence? How do
we try and negotiate or use diplomacy to achieve peace with an enemy that figuratively
speaks, thinks, and operates according to their own religious rule and deliberately
disregards ours?’ Magnus Ranstorp ended his pre-9/11 article saying, “At present, it is
doubtful that the United States or any western government is adequately prepared to meet
this challenge.”91 Steve Simon started his post-9/11 article saying,
The social, economic, and political conditions in the Arab and broader Islamic
world that have helped give rise to al-Qaeda will not be easily changed. The
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maximalist demands of the new terrorists obviate dialogue or negotiation.
Traditional strategies of deterrence by retaliation are unlikely to work, because the
militant Islamists have no territory to hold at risk, seek sacrifice, and court
Western attacks that will validate their claims about Western hostility to Islam.92
Thus, Simon describes prospects for successful policy options as bleak and
ultimately suggests “a strategy of containment, while seeking ways to redress, over the
long run, underlying causes.”93 Indeed, after over a decade of largely kinetic operations
against our enemy, and the rise of ISIS, a deadlier al-Qaeda, Simon’s strategy of ‘contain
while figuring something else out’ arguably reflects the U.S. strategy to date.
When looked at through the lens of religious, ‘new’, millenarian-apocalyptic
terrorism, particularly that of militant Islamist ideology, perceptions of hopelessness or
bleak prospects as just described are understandable. When looked at through the lens of
the arguments and theories in the section above, however, such millenarian-apocalyptic
motivations seem less alarming. Undoubtedly, the degree to which militant Islamist
ideology matters is arguably one of the most contentious debates of national security,
with each side adamantly supporting their argument and disproving the other. After
careful deliberation over variations of both sides of the argument, this thesis argues that
ideology is relevant, but not because it is religious, or Islamic, in nature, but because as
an ideology, it provides its potential and current members with a strong sense of identity,
a cause to believe in and fight for, and a simple explanation and solution for all that is
wrong in the world.
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Various scholars have noted the importance of developing a distinct identity for
youth development.94 Accomplishing the task of creating a distinct identity, and thereby a
sense of purpose, fosters healthy development and psychological ease. Adolescent
psychiatrist Lois Flaherty explains that youth years, those of the early 20s, are a time of
consolidation of identity during which individuals are unsettled, trying to work out their
place in the world, and are determined to make a difference through changing themselves
or the outside world. By the time the individual reaches young adulthood, ties with
parents have been loosened and identity consolidation has largely been achieved. The
next phase involves a transitional period between late adolescence and adulthood in
which “fitting in, being accepted, and feeling good about oneself—sustaining a sense of
dignity and self-esteem—are the key developmental tasks of this era.”95 If these tasks are
sufficiently achieved, the end result is an established identity with an understanding of
where it fits within society. However, if these tasks are not achieved, “the result may be a
sense of not fitting in, not accomplishing anything worthwhile, not making any
difference, and being unimportant.”96
Concurrently, Flaherty explains that developing a cultural and ethnic identity is
another important feature in late adolescence. Cultural identity, as described by Flaherty,
“involves the story of one’s people and how they came to be where they now are in the
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world.”97 Wexler describes cultural identity as “recognizing one’s cultural attributes—
beliefs, values, practices, norms, traditions, and heritage—along with understanding how
they are (and are not) reflected in one’s self. These cultural attributes are both internally
and externally defined, as they come from personal choices as well as ascriptions of
others.”98
In the simplest of situations, a consonance exists between all of these points of
reference. The views of one’s family, school, and friends regarding life are
basically similar, resulting in patterned interactions with the environment that
reflects one’s views of oneself and are mutually reinforcing. In times of rapid
social change and a high degree of social mobility or when social institutions such
as schools espouse different ideas from parents’…dissonance is likely to be the
rule. Whatever the case, the individual is still faced with the task of sorting out for
himself or herself a separate and unique identity. A daunting task at best, but
much more difficult when the choices are seen as offering no rewards.
During this process, youth are looking for something strong and dependable to
believe in, and their choices are limited by the available possibilities--any mentor, group,
or activity that is accessible could facilitate the process. Establishing a cultural identity
“helps individuals find their place in larger temporal and social contexts and situates
them as actors in their community and in the world. This is important developmentally
since young people tend to do better if they identify with values that transcend
themselves.”99 Such cultural identity, of course, reinforces a sense of individual identity;
Joane Nagel illustrated how the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s encouraged
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American Indian individuals to claim their native ancestry such that the U.S. Census
recorded triple the number of people claiming American Indian heritage.100
In the case where individual and cultural identities are insufficiently developed,
the perception may be that the misery (caused by the lack of a distinct identity) is caused
by outside persons or groups. Such perceptions can also be shared by an entire group of
people, “strengthened and reinforced within the community, and transmitted from one
generation to the next.101 In these cases, “ideologies that pin the cause of anomie on an
enemy and groups that offer the individual a sense of purpose and self-worth by rejecting
the system are naturally appealing.”102 Becoming a part of these groups and adopting
their ideologies one puts on “trappings of power and superiority by adopting an ideology
that tells them they are special, important, and have a glorious role to play…. thus,
belonging to the group and believing in its ideology protect against the shame and
humiliation that the youth would otherwise feel.”103
Considering all of this, it is facile to see how militant Islamist ideology can and
does provide individuals with a sense of identity. Firstly, militant Islamist ideology’s use
of Quranic archetypes readily explains history, the present, and the future as explained
earlier. This allows those attracted to militant Islamist ideology to have an understanding
of their cultural history, its story of how it came to be, and where it stands now, as
Flaherty described. As the story goes, the Crusaders of the West have been actively
attacking Islamic lands and working to subjugate Muslims across the world for centuries
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to achieve godless power. As a result, the once great Kingdom of Islam has been
dismantled and its Muslims have been forced to live in conditions of poverty, despair,
and godlessness. This helps the individual place themselves within the larger temporal
and social context of that history as an active member of the community as Wexler
explained. Militant Islamist ideology’s blaming of the West and apostates also helps the
individual make sense of their misery as someone else’s fault. Thus, the individual
assumes the identity as a Muslim participating in the wider Islamist mission to reinstate
Islam as the law of the land. This cultural and individual identity gives the individual the
key post-adolescent elements of purpose, self-esteem, and dignity; it fulfills the need to
find meaning in life.
To demonstrate, Maajid Nawaz, a former member of Hizbu-al-Tahrir (HT),
describes his path towards and away from being a radical Islamist in his book Radical.
Nawaz, of Pakistani descent, was born in the seventies and grew up in the predominantly
white neighborhood of Southend in Essex, England. Growing up in England meant
Nawaz did not readily identify with his Pakistani culture; however, growing up as a
member of a minority in England meant that he also did not feel affiliated to England.104
Furthermore, with the rise in concern for AIDS in the mid-eighties as well as the rise in
skinhead, neo-Nazi culture, Nawaz was consistently on the receiving end of racism and
prejudice, from both his peers as well as the authorities, throughout his adolescence.
Initially, hip-hop music and culture provided Nawaz and his fellow ethnic friends with a
sense of identity and purpose; in describing his acclamation to hip-hop culture Nawaz
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said, “we felt we had a way to fight back,”105 and that they “were buzzing on a sound, an
identity, that we could finally claim as our own”106
However, Nawaz’s experience with racism and prejudice grew increasingly
violent with multiple knife fights and unfair run-ins with the police. Meanwhile, Islamist
groups and ideology were on the rise across the world in response to the war in Bosnia.
“In Bosnia, white, blond-haired, blue-eyed indigenous European Muslims were being
massacred just because they were Muslim…In reaction to these atrocities, Muslims in
Europe began asserting their religious identities even more.”107 At the brink of another
knife fight, Nawaz’s brother, already a committed Islamist, managed to avoid the fight by
identifying himself as an Islamist terrorist; “I told him we’re Muslims and we don’t fear
death. We’re like those Palestinian terrorists he sees on the televisions blowing up
planes.”108 Their opponents backed down, scared, “and that came from the assertive new
identity Osman [brother] had adopted. Islamism. It had done what years of knife fights
could not. It had won the psychological war and defeated our enemy...In one
conversation, Islamism did what hip-hop couldn’t do”109
That moment was the first time Nawaz realized the power of Islamism and he
wanted more. “I realized Islamism could give me the respect that I’d craved since
primary school”110 As a result, Nawaz moved to London to become an active member of
HT, living in a house with other members, attending study groups, and lobbying for their
cause. “So there was a real vacuum in my identity, which was the ideal place for someone
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to be before recruitment to an Islamist organization. They [HT] were able to offer me an
identity that had previously been absent”111; “after the typical town atmosphere of
Southend, and the feeling of being part of a fractional minority, I now felt plugged into a
far larger community, a thriving London network buzzing with ideas.”112
Thus, as Nawaz’s experience demonstrates, Islamist and militant Islamist
ideologies provide those susceptible to them with identity, purpose, and motivation,
validating the relevance of the ideology. The arguments and theories posited by
Crenshaw, Coolsaet, and others may suggest militant Islamist terrorism is just another cut
of the same cloth, and that terrorism is not new and religious terrorism is not special;
however, that does not mean that militant Islamist ideology lacks significance in
comparison to other driving factors. Furthermore, though scholars of ‘new’ terrorism and
millenarian-apocalyptic ideologies suggest the religious nature of religious terrorism
serve as a legitimizing factor for violence and causes its adherents to operate according to
their own, cosmic rules, this thesis argues that those characteristics are not what make
militant Islamist ideology significant. Describing and distinguishing the religious nature
of the Islamist ideology does little in the way of stemming its tide, and instead, suggests
that little can be done or worse, that the religion of Islam as a whole is the problem. Thus,
in considering the lessons in the above section, this thesis proposes considering what
militant Islamist ideology provides its adherents rather than what it is as reason for its
relevance. Dawson mentions an old adage in her article, which states that no one joins a
dangerous cult or terrorist cell. “Converts invariably see the act of joining in positive
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terms, as beneficial for both themselves, their society, and the cosmos.”113 Thus, in
looking at militant Islamist ideology through the lens of identity, it becomes apparent
what benefits its adherents believe they are getting, which happen to be benefits that can
be easily provided elsewhere, through other non-violent means. This, arguably, is where
CVE should begin.
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CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF CVE POLICIES IN THE UK, SAUDI
ARABIA, AND THE U.S.

The initiative of CVE emerged as part of the wider strategic objective of
countering terrorism by going beyond military measures and addressing the underlying
roots of terrorism through multi-faceted programs. The purpose of this chapter is to
explore the CVE initiatives in the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the emerging
programs in the U.S in order to discover ways in which the U.S. can effectively address
militant Islamist ideology per the lessons learned in Chapter One. While the programs in
the UK and Saudi Arabia are each profoundly shaped by cultural, political, and legal
elements unique to its country, they bear significant characteristics and challenges that
could benefit the U.S. in its implementation of its own CVE programs.
CVE arose in response to the various terrorist attacks that took place across
the world in the early 2000’s. Generally speaking, CVE aims to produce counter
narratives that challenge extremist and violent extremist messages using a wide range of
activities such as public diplomacy, social and educational outreach programs and
targeted government campaigns in addition to existing security measures.114 A large part
of these activities is an effort to raise awareness of the process of radicalization and how
to recognize symptoms of this process.115 Essentially, due to the multi-dimensional nature
of the radicalization process and of terrorism, CVE programs have responded in kind,
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utilizing social, economic, political and historical contexts in order to holistically
approach the instances in which violence can arise.116 Furthermore, “approaches to CVE
generally aim to combine hard and soft powers. Hard powers being means to achieve
desired outcomes via the use of military and economic sanctions, soft power being power
that 'co ops people rather than coerces them.”117 Given the recent rise of CVE as a policy
initiative, it is noteworthy that there is, thus, little empirical evidence to go off and
therefore a lack of conclusive scholarship on what exactly CVE is, how it should be done
and its positive and negative effects. Regardless, in a recent literature review of CVE,
Nasser-Eddine and other scholars found that despite the lack of concrete definitions, CVE
“stands as a phenomenon that is both self evident and taken for granted,” and “the
dominant frame for understanding the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, as
presented in the contemporary literature, is that of transnational Islamist networks.”118
Indeed, the programs within the UK, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. fall within that
framework.

UK’s Prevent Strategy
Following the 2005 London subway bombings, the UK recognized that it needed
to tackle support for, and the promotion of, violent Islamist ideologies within British
society. This resulted in the creation of Prevent, an add-on to the UK’s existing counter
terrorism strategy, CONTEST. In 2011, the UK government published a revised
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CONTEST, and therefore Prevent strategy, that corrected various flaws that surfaced in
the early stages of implementation, and committed to issuing annual updates on its
counterterrorism policies. As per the 2011 revision, the aim of Prevent is to “stop people
from becoming terrorists or supporting them.”119 The most recent annual report of 2014
identifies that while no terrorist attack had occurred in the UK during 2014, the frequency
of terrorist attacks worldwide had increased about 40%, to 12,000 in 2013, and with the
rise of the group known as ISIL, or Daesh, in Iraq and Syria, the threat level for the UK
was raised to ‘SEVERE’ from ‘SUBSTANTIAL.’120
Aspects of the Prevent strategy published in 2011 continue to be executed;
however, due to the evolving nature of the threat, the 2014 annual report has
implemented a change in emphasis. The 2011 revision of CONTEST and its Prevent
components was in response to rising criticisms that the strategy was narrowly focused
on the Muslim community and needed to, instead, address all forms of extremism. Thus,
the 2011 revision made it a point to broaden its scope121; however, due to the evolving
nature of the threat since 2011, the 2014 report specifically identifies militant Islamist
terrorists as the principal threat to the UK, most notably those in Iraq in Syria. This is
also a change from the 2011 publishing, where al Qaeda and its affiliates were identified
as the biggest terrorist threat. The 2014 report does mention, however, that there were
several attempted attacks on army recruitment centers by “Dissident Republicans,”
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indicating that a threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism does still exist. Far right
extremism is also identified as a threat but is described as low in comparison to the
principal threat of Daesh and other Islamist terrorists.
Given this context, the specific objectives of the Prevent strategy are:
1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from
those who promote it;
2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given
appropriate advice and support; and
3. Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization,
which we need to address.
And success in Prevent will mean:
1. There is a reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in this country and in
states overseas whose security most impacts on our own;
2. There is more effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared
by terrorist organizations and used by terrorists to legitimize violence; and
3. There is more challenge to and isolations of extremists and terrorists operating
on the Internet.
Objective One: The Ideological Challenge. Prevent determines challenging
ideology as an essential part of its counter terrorism strategy because “ideology is one of
the key characteristics of terrorism and a central factor in the radicalization process.” 122
Therefore, it utilizes projects in education, communities, and the criminal justice system
that “enable people to effectively challenge terrorist ideology;” however, it specifies that
it will not engage in matters of theology, but rather will support the key roles of mosques
and imams who have already taken a leading role in reaching and engaging with young
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Muslims as well as ensure that work done by theologians, academics, and communities is
wide circulated. Examples programs of this nature funded by Prevent include:


The Islam Citizenship Education Project - develops educational projects within
madrassas and universities that encourage and develop awareness of extremist
speakers on campus and balance them with speakers of different perspectives.



National Offender Management Service - supports Muslim chaplains in prisons to
challenge extremist views.



Radical Middle Way - a Muslim-led project which specializes in bringing
traditional Muslim scholars to speak to young British Muslim audiences.



M-Power - reaches out to young Somalis to provide them with safe discussion
spaces to debate issues such as radicalization, terrorism and democracy.



The FCO and DCLG also sponsored a series of ‘road shows’ by Muslim
community groups around the country involving lectures, debates and cultural
events aimed at promoting a mainstream message of Islam on a number of key
issues, including terrorism. The FCO supported further initiatives overseas,
networking imams from this country with counterparts elsewhere to understand
extremist issues and how they might best be addressed.
Furthermore, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) was

established in the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in order to conduct
research and develop proposals on ways to describe the terrorist threat. It aimed to
primarily work with local and national organizations to develop and disseminate counter
narratives and has focused on geographical areas where evidence indicates high levels of
extremist propaganda. “In its first few years, RICU developed proposals about ways to
describe the terrorist threat which were accurate, likely to be understood and accepted but
which would not inadvertently lend credence to the claims about counter-terrorism made
by extremist and terrorist groups. Some of these proposals were adopted by Government
and reflected in the language which Government used (the term ‘war on terrorism’, for
example, was judged to be prone to misinterpretation and has generally been avoided in
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this country).”123 The work on producing counter-narratives, however, has been described
as ‘variable’ and ‘not as successful as we want,’ in separate documents. Their work
struggled to have an impact and was difficult to evaluate. “Although RICU was right to
focus on working with local and national organizations to develop and disseminate
counter-narratives, some of those organizations have struggled to make themselves heard
and failed to draw a clear line between messages about counter-narrative and cohesion.
More care now needs to be taken to identify credible partners and to develop powerful
and specific narratives across a range of communications channels, especially on the
Internet.”124 In reference to future expectations of RICU it was expressed, “much greater
emphasis will also be given to measuring the impact of RICU’s programme,” and “to
ensure value for money, there will be independent scrutiny of RICU’s projects and the
help they provide to non-Government organizations.”125
Prevent also utilizes censorship methods as part of its strategy. Given that social
media and the Internet are thoroughly utilized by Islamist groups, “removing terrorist
material remains a high priority” for CONTEST and Prevent.126 Per the laws in the UK,
the government is permitted to remove Internet content that is deemed conducive to
terrorism. A dedicated specialist police unit, the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit
(CTIRU), has continued to be funded to refer content that breaches UK terrorism
legislation. In 2014, the volume of unlawful content removed was at about 46,000 and
about 70% of CTIRU’s caseload was related to Syria and Iraq.127 Between 2010 and
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2011, over 4,000 URLs were taken down.128 The increase in material removed is
attributed to a new public referral platform that was launched in March 2014. A newer,
Internet-related initiative involves engagement with the Internet industry to see whether
filtering products are an effective tool to protect vulnerable people from content that is
not illegal, but is extremist and possible harmful. In a more extreme censorship method,
the Home Secretary, equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of State, has the power to exclude
or deport non-British citizens on grounds of national security if they engage in what is
termed ‘unacceptable behavior.’ By 2011, over 130 individuals had been excluded and in
the 2012 reports it was stated that increasing using of this power has been made.
The 2011 revision found several issues in regards to the implementation and
effectiveness of activities geared towards responding to ideological threats. The first issue
identified was the absence of a clear explanation of ideology and “what it means, what it
includes and what needs to be done about it and by whom.” Further issues of clarity were
found, including the lack of a clear audience, of direct impact on those targeted, and of
overall understanding on how terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist
ideologies. However, as of the 2012 annual reports, the government has reportedly
significantly improved its understanding of the people and organizations who are most
heavily engaged in radicalization. It claims to having learned that far right and Islamist
groups “feed off one another and try to create enmity, suspicion, and hatred between our
communities” with their respective ideologies that are each anti-democratic, intolerant,
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and conducive to violence.129 Regardless, the Prevent strategy repeatedly recognized the
need for further research in various areas in 2011, and given the also recognized evolving
nature of the threat, it is likely that the need for further research remains in 2015.
Objective Two: Protecting Vulnerable People. “This area of Prevent is based
on the premise that people being drawn into radicalization and recruitment can be
identified and then provided with support.”130 The purpose of the support is to dissuade
individuals from engaging in terrorist related activity and to remove them from the sphere
of terrorist influence and contact. Allegations have been made that efforts in this area of
Prevent go against freedom of expression and are a form of spying and intelligence
gathering for the sake of policing. To rebut, the revised strategy states, “taking early
action to protect people from radicalization is not the same as surveillance or intelligence
gathering. It is intended to pre-empt not to facilitate law enforcement.”131 It is posited that
if carried out proportionally and handled properly, programs in this area can work to
positively influence cognitive and behavioral change related to terrorist tendencies.
The majority of the activity in this area has been delivered through Channel, “a
police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk
of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime
reduction panels.”132 The referral process is comprised of three steps: identification, risk
and assessment, and referral and support. The identifications go through frontline staff
who are responsible for assessing the individuals reported to them as to whether or not
they are at risk of being drawn towards terrorism. As of 2011, Channel covered about 75
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local authorities and 12 police forces. The Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent has
been developed to help coordinators identify signs of vulnerability and has been delivered
to roughly 15,000 frontline staff. Following identification, those deemed as vulnerable
are referred to coordinators, typically from a police background, who assess the
individual and decide whether or not they should move onto the support stage or exit the
program. If the coordinator decides to advance the individual onto the support stage,
various options are available such as counseling, faith guidance, and civic engagement.
Various institutions have provided these services, including community-based projects
funded by local authorities, local religious or community leaders, teachers and
organizations directly funded by the OSCT.
Overall, the use of Channel to identify and intercept those at risk of radicalization
has provided a set of statistics that can be used to tangibly gauge progress, something that
is near absent in other areas of evaluation. Since December 2010, 1120 people have been
referred to the Channel program, 286 of which were assessed to be in need of an
intervention.133 Though not mentioned in the 2011 revision, a noteworthy statistic from
Sir Norman Bettison, the lead for Prevent Policing of the Association of Chief Police
Officers, states that, “thus far, not one of the 1,500 people that have been intervened with
have been arrested for any terrorist related offence.”134 This demonstrates the
implementation of Prevent’s aim to use soft power as a counter-narrative.
Objective Three: Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of
radicalization. Based off of evidence that suggests radicalization occurs in places where
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terrorist ideologies go uncontested, this part of the strategy aims to work with institutions
within those places to ensure there is an understanding of radicalization and how to
develop an effective response. These areas are schools and children, higher education, the
internet, faith institutions, health, the criminal justice system, the charitable sector and
overseas. Prevent engages specifically with these sectors because it is believed that they
are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges posed by radicalization.
Given the wide range of sectors, Prevent recognizes that it needs to be extremely flexible
when working with each of these sectors; indeed, “measures that are suitable in a prison
will not be suitable in a university.”135 Generally speaking, within each of these sectors,
Prevent seeks to equip existing institutions with information and support necessary to
recognize, assess and deal with symptoms of radicalization. For example, informational
DVD’s have been provided to primary schools for teachers to present to children and
student unions of university campuses are being utilized to disseminate counter-extremist
narratives.
In the end, the UK’s Prevent strategy has fully surfaced as an all-encompassing
CVE program. Though it has seen heavy criticisms of spying on its citizens and being
too-broadly based, it is a robust program with intentions of addressing the roots of
terrorism and is currently in the process of correcting its mistakes and fine-tuning its
capabilities.

135

United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Home Department, Prevent, 63.
52

Saudi Arabia’s PRAC Strategy
The CVE program in Saudi Arabia materialized in response to militant Islamist
domestic terror campaigns between the years of 1995 and 2003. Like the UK program,
Saudi Arabia recognized that security measures alone could not effectively address the
issue of violent extremism and therefore developed the Prevention, Rehabilitation, and
Aftercare (PRAC) strategy. Also like the UK, Saudi Arabia sees violent extremism as a
result of radical ideologies, specifically radical Islam. However, unlike the UK, Saudi
Arabia has the advantage of being able to address the messages of radical Islam from a
point of legitimacy due to its Islamic roots. Thus, the PRAC strategy aims to “cast
extremism as illegitimate for having perverted true Islam” and “aspires to help misguided
believers return to the correct understandings of Islam.”136 Where a key concern of
Prevent is avoiding taking the position of religious arbiter, Saudi Arabia and PRAC seek
to do just that. In doing so, Saudi Arabia’s CVE program not only works to advocate and
develop an Islam supported by the government, but also works to reaffirm state
authority.137
PRAC is composed of three separate but integrated programs:
1. Deterring individuals from becoming involved in extremism.
2. Rehabilitation of extremists and individuals who get involved with them.
3. Providing aftercare programs to facilitate reintegration into society after
their release from custody.
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Prevention. The government has established hundreds of programs aimed at
prevention, ranging from educational programs to advertisement programs. These
institutions, most of which are implemented through the “guidance department” at the
Ministry of Interior, are designed to short-circuit radicalization by confronting extremism
through the promotion of a moderate, pious Islam. The target audience of this effort isn’t
extremists, but rather the larger population that may sympathize and support extremism
and beliefs that might lead to extremism. In essence, this part of PRAC is similar to
Objective Three in Prevent, in that it works with existing institutions in order to develop
and disseminate a counter-narrative to violent extremism. The difference with this area of
PRAC, as mentioned before, is the ability to utilize religion as a means to develop that
counter-narrative. Examples include:
1. Some schools hold writing contests and art competitions in which students
“depict different topics such as the impact of terrorism on the population or
the role of the public in protecting the country from terrorism.”138
2. Evidence suggests that a large portion of radicalization within schools come
from teachers who use their position to preach radical ideas to their students.
Thus, a teacher monitoring process has been implemented that sends
problematic teachers to King Fahd Security College where they go through a
series of five classes aimed at retraining. Those with little progress are placed
in positions away from students while those who fail to progress are
dismissed.
3. Government supported activities such as sporting events, car racing, and
camel racing in an effort replace summer camps and questionable religious
retreats often organized by extremist groups.
4. Large-scale public information and communication campaigns utilize
billboards and other advertisements to focus on the evils of terrorism and
support moderate Islam. One image featured two clasped hands, one of a
person in traditional Arab dress, and the other in uniform, encouraging
cooperation with security personnel and shunning extremists.
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Rehabilitation. Where the Prevention area of PRAC is focused on the population
surrounding extremists, this section is a concerted effort geared towards rehabilitating
and reeducating violent extremists and its sympathizers through “intensive religious
debates and psychological counseling.”139 The center of gravity for this area is a
counseling program that is administered by the Advisory Committee in the Ministry of
Interior. This Advisory Committee is made up of four subcommittees, each tasked with
different portions of the counseling process. The Religious Subcommittee is the largest
one, made up of over 100 clerics, scholars and university professors, and engages in
religious dialogue and debate with detainees. The Psychological and Social
Subcommittee, comprised of roughly 50 psychologists, psychiatrists, social scientists and
researchers, is responsible for evaluating a detainee’s behavior and psychological
progress throughout the program. The Security Subcommittee is tasked with monitoring
security risks, behavior and making release recommendations. They are also responsible
for monitoring detainees after release. Lastly, the Media Subcommittee produces
materials that reinforce various messages that counter extremist ideas and support basic
tenets of Islam. These materials are used throughout mosques and schools and come in
various formats such pamphlets, books and TV programs. Together, these subcommittees
work together to convey to the prisoners that extremists do not care about them, but
rather use them to advance their own violent agendas. In conjunction, the subcommittees
work to demonstrate that they and the Saudi government do care about them and that it
will do as much as it can to support them.
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The counseling process begins inside prison and subsequently moves to a
rehabilitation facility. Central to the success of the rehabilitation program has been the
declaration on behalf of the Advisory Committee upon initially meeting a prisoner that
they are not employed by or associated with the Ministry of Interior. Instead, they stress
that they are independent religious scholars, which is intended to create a necessary level
of credibility in the eyes of the prisoner. Furthermore, the program stresses that those
interacting with detainees must not lecture them, but instead engage with them in
discussion and debate. Thus, in the first meeting, Advisory Committee members simply
listen to the detainee and ask questions regarding the motivations behind their actions and
their beliefs. Only after listening to the detainee explain their motives and opinions do
the scholars attempt to convince them that the religious justifications for their actions are
wrong and based upon a corrupted, incomplete understanding of Islam. To do this, the
Advisory Committee runs two programs, one short program lasting a couple of hours and
a long program that lasts several weeks. After the respective program is complete, an
exam is given to address the prisoner’s progress. Those who pass the exam move onto the
next phase, those who do not pass repeat the course. Due to the discursive nature of this
process, the advancement from one stage to the next is not always clear.
Though significant attention is attributed towards counseling and reeducating the
prisoner, similar, if not equal attention is given to the prisoner’s family. If the prisoner is
the head of the household, the Advisory Committee has the ability to support the
prisoner’s family by providing them with an alternate salary, schooling and health care.
The motive behind this is “to offset any hardship and further radicalization brought on by
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the arrest of family members.”140 Thus, not only is the issue of radical ideologies
addressed at the individual level, but it is also mitigated at the family level.
Aftercare Programs. Aftercare programs work to ease the process of
transitioning from life within the program into society. Once a prisoner has completed the
previous process to the satisfaction of the Advisory Committee members, they are
transferred to an external rehabilitation facility. This facility, called the Care
Rehabilitation Center (CRC), acts as a halfway house, facilitating the transition back into
society. The CRC offers an improved living environment from prison; detainees live in
dormitory-style housing, have access to open grassy areas, and participate in group
activities. Additionally, guards in the CRC do not wear uniforms and frequently socialize
with detainees, often participating with them in group sports. The CRC provides the
detainee with brief and recurring exposure to life outside the state’s custody while also
providing staff members the ability to observe and monitor the detainees behavior in an
environment that is similar to real life, allowing them to test the sincerity of the detainees
progress. After spending roughly 8-12 weeks at the CRC, the detainee will be released if
staff members deem they are ready.
Once they are released, continuous social support is provided in order to prevent
recidivism. Such support includes assistance in locating a job, obtaining a mode of
transportation and leasing an apartment. Furthermore, former detainees are encouraged to
continue meeting with those staff members they interacting with while in the program.
They are also encouraged to settle down and start a family, since evidence suggests doing
so will likely prevent any engagement in violence. To support this, the government offers
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to pay for weddings, dowries and other pre-marriage arrangements. In essence, through
these efforts, the PRAC strategy goes beyond the end of the program to continue support
and ensure sustainment.141

United States
In 2011, the White House published Empowering Local Partners to Prevent
Violent Extremism in the United States and its subsequent Strategic Implementation Plan
(SIP), both of which emanate from the National Security Strategy published in May of
2011 and embody the US CVE programs. The SIP was ultimately the product of
collaboration between various agencies including DOJ, FBI, DOS, DOD, HHS, and
NCTC and it determined that traditional national security or law enforcement agencies
such as DHS, DOJ, and the FBI would execute many of the programs and activities
outlined. As such, DOJ, DHS, and NCTC selected three cities, Boston, Los Angeles, and
Minneapolis, to run pilot CVE programs “to identify promising practices” that would
inform and inspire community efforts to help eliminate conditions that lead to alienation
and violent extremism. According to the Attorneys General office, these cities were
chosen “based on their existing achievements with community engagement;” however,
considering the Boston Marathon attacks in 2015 and the fact that Minneapolis is home to
the largest Somali community in the U.S. from which several individuals have left to join
al-Shabaab, the reason for the choice of these cities is up for argument. Led by the U.S.
Attorneys in each district, these cities developed CVE frameworks that outlined the ideas
and efforts to be pursued in order to meet the stated goals. Across the board, each pilot
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program aims to engage the local community such that all efforts are community-driven.
Additionally, each program seeks to utilize the collaboration of some combination of
government agencies and non-government local stakeholders such as Non-governmental
Organizations (NGO), social service providers, schools, and faith-based organizations.
Los Angeles. The LA Framework142 was published in February 2015 after years
of development between multiple agencies and stakeholders. The three pillars of the
framework are prevention, intervention, and interdiction, which are meant to mitigate a
variety of risk factors, as described below:
Prevention addresses communal needs and focuses on expanding engagement as
well as promoting healthy and resilient communities through community-driven
programs and initiatives. Intervention, or “Off Ramps,” focuses on individual
needs. The interdiction component addresses security and community safety risks.
Both prevention and intervention are early mechanisms of risk mitigation,
whereas interdiction is a mechanism for disrupting criminal threats.
Prevention in the framework is defined as collective efforts aimed at closing a
range of gaps and social openings by which violent ideologies can find legitimacy.
Prevention is achieved, according to the framework, through the progression of
expanding engagement, building networks, and collaboratively delivering community
driven programs. These prevention strategies “aim to build healthy, resilient communities
where it is more difficult for violent ideologies to take root,” and form the bedrock of the
LA Framework.
Expanding Engagement. The engagement component of prevention is meant to
produce ongoing dialogue between government agencies and the local community, in
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which the government agencies are to be at the forefront of the engagement efforts.
Formats identified for government-driven engagements include public forums, town
halls, and interfaith events, among others. The City of Los Angeles Human Relations
Commission (City HRC), an already existing entity that provides a space to convene
diverse communities and connect needed resources, plays an active role in advocating for
access and inclusion of diverse communities, which local community leaders reciprocate
to create open, two-way dialogue. Additionally, law enforcement agencies are to work
towards strengthening trust and building community partnerships through community
policing and engagement strategies aimed at effectively addressing community needs and
concerns.
Building Networks. Through such engagement strategies, the framework seeks to
build and establish networks, defined as relationships with key partners that can build
coalitions, provide resources, and expand the reach of community-based programs. At the
time of publishing, the city was in the early stages of creating sustainable networks and
identified overarching categories of potential partners such as the Department of Mental
Health in the public sector and media companies in the private sector. The framework
claims that the city, in the months before publishing, “had begun to move in the direction
of expanding these networks of partners.”
Community-Led Initiatives. Lastly, the framework seeks to utilize and deliver
community-led initiatives, which may be entirely separate from CVE itself but still
relevant. Examples of this include academic programs such as Bayan Clermont, social
service organizations such as the Niswa Association, and faith-based partnerships such as
the New Ground. While these are examples of initiatives that exist and operate separate
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from CVE, there are also CVE-specific examples such as the Safe Spaces Initiative run
by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC). Next steps in the area are stated to
include the need to establish more direct links between the networks established
mentioned above, and these community driven initiatives in effort to identify and provide
needed resources to support them. “Overall, community-driven local programs aim to
address challenges around identity formation, integration, intergroup relations, political
discourse, and social services.”
While prevention programs focus on fostering community resiliency, stakeholders
involved with the LA Framework have been working to build a comprehensive,
community-led intervention program that would provide individuals already deemed to
be on a path towards violent extremism with so-called “off-ramps.” These “off-ramps”
are meant to provide rehabilitative care in the form of social services, mental health,
faith-based and other services for at-risk individuals in effort to steer them off the path
towards violent extremism. The framework proclaims that no formal intervention
program currently exists, but that “interventions do occur by parents, educators, members
of clergy, and others when individuals who need help are identified.” The framework
goes on to explain that there are several outstanding issues that need to be addressed
before making a formal program; these issues are as follows:


A reliable analysis and assessment of legal liabilities for interveners;



A more robust inventory of available resources;



Strategies to ensure that concerns about civil rights, civil liberties, and data
privacy protection are adequately addressed;



Credible research-based baselines for indicators of violent extremism; and
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A mechanism for providing collaborative input into the intervention process that
avoids securitizing the process, while recognizing potential risks to the
community and ensuring appropriate mitigation responses are utilized.
The framework describes interdiction efforts, such as investigation, arrest, and

potential prosecution, as an important component that is “critical to stopping individuals
who are intent on committing violence, investigating crimes associated with extremist
violence, creating an environment where the public feels safe to go about their daily lives,
and serving as a deterrent to those who may aspire to commit acts of violence.” The
framework notes, however, that efforts are being made within law enforcement to ensure,
whenever appropriate, that alternatives to interdiction are maximized.
Challenges. The complexity of the framework and its components is duly
recognized at its end, including the following challenges in going forward.
1. Identifying and increasing access to additional resources, grants, and other
funding sources to facilitate and support capacity-building and
community-driven initiatives.
2. Expanding prevention efforts networks within and across neighboring
counties to ensure continuity and to facilitate a “regional” and “whole of
nation” approach.
3. Expanding and enhancing engagement efforts with women and youth so
that stronger partnerships and leadership can be developed within those
groups.
4. Expanding networks to better link with local education, mental health,
emergency management, and health and social services organizations.
5. Addressing the complex legal and liability issues that arise in the context
of developing intervention models.
6. Developing capacity for enhanced outreach and social media influence,
both at a government and community-based level.
7. Developing better methodologies for effectively measuring the impact of
CVE outreach, engagement methods, and initiatives.
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8. Addressing community reluctance to engage with government partners,
including a pervasive grassroots antipathy to the concept of “CVE,”
entrenched negative perception of law enforcement, and a view that law
enforcement methods securitize relationships, stigmatize communities,
violate privacy rights and civil liberties, and constitute a form of spying.
9. Engaging with the community to clarify and discuss the methods,
independent oversight procedures, and goals of law enforcement in its
fight against violent extremism.
10. Given limited resources, engaging in continuous efforts to counter the
narrative of extremists, while balancing the need to address day-to-day
crime.
11. Enhancing civic engagement that reaches more grassroots community
members and not just community leaders.
Boston: A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies. The
Boston Framework143, published in February of 2015, is set up in a way to incorporate
violent extremism into already existing violent prevention efforts. United States Attorney
Carmen M. Ortiz states in the framework’s introduction, “throughout my tenure, I have
worked with nontraditional partners, like schools, service providers and academia, to find
ways to reduce gun and gang violence through non-law enforcement methods. I believe
that these innovative strategies are not only effective, but necessary in order to develop a
framework to counter violent extremism in the Greater Boston region.” She goes on to
explain that the efforts outlined in the framework are meant to complement, not replace,
traditional tools of law enforcement. Like the other two frameworks, the Boston
Framework is the product of collaboration between various agencies and stakeholders in
the Greater Boston region, coordinated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Massachusetts.
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The goal of the framework is “to increase the capacity of community and
government as a way to protect vulnerable individuals from engagement in and the nation
from violent extremism.” Violent extremists are defined as “individuals who support or
commit ideologically-motivated violence to further personal, political or social
objectives, sometimes without direction from or influence by a foreign actor,” and
countering violent extremism is considered as focusing “on using prevention and
intervention approaches as a way to minimize the risk of individuals being inspired by
violent extremist ideologies or recruited by violent extremist groups.” As such, to achieve
the goal, the frame has been designed to “allow local communities the flexibility to
define their problem areas, create achievable goals and objectives, and develop realistic
implementation plans,” such that the specific needs of the local community can be met.
The framework clarifies, however, that for the Greater Boston region, CVE efforts
do not include a law enforcement suppression component, such as the “Interdiction”
component of the LA Framework. Rather, those suppression components are considered
to be a part of counterterrorism efforts and are utilized once an individual has begun to
prepare for or engage in ideologically motivated violence. Furthermore, such that the
framework aims to act as an extension of existing violence prevention and intervention
strategies, it is noted that the proposed solutions “are not entirely unique from other
prevention related strategies that are currently being implemented (or can be
implemented) through broader efforts by public health, mental health, non-profit
organizations, private partnerships, government and others. Rather than create a program
specifically labeled Countering Violent Extremism, a more effective approach might be
to expand the capacity and resources of agencies and organizations to ensure that they are
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able to enhance the work that they are already doing as well as leverage existing
successful programs to help address violent extremism.” This is due to the fact that
endorsing specific CVE programs for a certain community that has not specifically asked
for such programs could stigmatize the program and its efforts, which could be
counterproductive and lead to further disenfranchised individuals.
Considering these complexities among others when working towards the states’
goal, the framework is formatted in a way that identifies problem areas and follows them
with solutions to consider:
1.

Some young people may be at greater risk of feeling isolated and
alienated, making them more vulnerable to recruitment by violent
extremists.

2.

Providing services to individuals before mobilization toward violent
extremism is challenging when there is a lack of understanding regarding
violent extremism and limited intervention programs.

3.

Social media and other media platforms are being used to recruit
individuals to join extremist groups and to encourage individuals to
engage in violence.

4.

U.S. policy and events around the globe can frustrate, anger and, at times,
influence some to think that there is no effective alternative other than to
express grievances or solidarity through the use of violence.

5.

Distrust between government and non-government hinders collaboration
and effective decision-making and problem solving.

6.

Lack of knowledge in mainstream society regarding religions, cultures and
thought systems which are unfamiliar or are maligned in the media,
contributes to poor perceptions that fuel and mutually reinforce fear and
estrangement.

7.

Individuals convicted of hate crimes and terrorism offenses require
specialized support and services before and after release from prison.
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Minneapolis-St. Paul Framework. The Minneapolis framework144 largely rests
on the fact that the city is home to the largest Somali immigrant population in the United
States and aims to build off of the alleged long-standing relationship between the Somali
community and local law enforcement. The framework states that several police
departments, including the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office and St. Paul Police
Department, regularly host Somali organizations in order to foster and develop an open
dialogue such that they can work together to stem the tide of recruitment into extremist
groups. The shortest and least detailed framework among the three, it was developed
“after months of listening to the community about its needs as well as reviewing available
research and talking with experts.” After identifying the root causes of radicalization, the
framework describes three components--engagement, prevention, and intervention—it
will utilize to address the causes, which, due to its brevity, will be listed in full.
Root causes:


Disaffected youth,



A deepening disconnect between youth and religious leaders,



Internal identity crisis,



Community isolation,



Lack of opportunity—including high unemployment, lack of activities for
youth, and few mentors.

The framework envisions more engagement between law enforcement and the
community to continue to build trust and develop relationships. There are several Somali
officers in local law enforcement. They are highly successful and well thought of in the
144
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community. The framework includes support for additional Somali law enforcement
officers, including increasing the number of entry-level positions, such as Community
Liaison Officers and Parking Enforcement Officers, with the goal of guiding and
mentoring candidates into full-time officer positions. In addition to continuing to build up
law enforcement engagement, trust and relationships need to be enhanced with other
partners and local stakeholders. This includes city, county and state government agencies
and corporations working to increase their engagement and connection to Somali
Minnesotans. Another component of this framework brings in federal agency partners
such as the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to help educate community members on airport screening processes and
provide direct assistance to community members that have expressed airport related
concerns.
Similar to other prevention strategies, the framework includes an increase in
youth programming such as after-school activities and mentor programs, higher
education scholarships and job opportunities. There will also be a social media campaign
providing positive messaging to the Somali community. As true in other at-risk
populations, providing more opportunities and positive messages for youth increases
public safety. Somali Minnesotan youth are an underserved community. The federal
government has a successful history working with local communities and providing
funding, research and other support for youth programming and mentoring. The Pilot
Program Framework envisions expanding these programs to include Somali Minnesota
youth. The Pilot Program has already brought together several partner organizations to
develop culturally competent programming.
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There will be two intervention models developed, one working within the school
systems and one working within the community. Both will be community-led. The school
model will expand a current model, which connects youth workers from the community,
bridging the gap between youth, their parents and the school system. These workers will
spend time in the lunchroom and in non-classroom settings, building relationships and
trust at school. They will provide connections and continuity during school and after for
both parents and the students. The second intervention model is based on community
volunteers, with mothers, community organizations, religious leaders and mental health
professionals working directly with families before law enforcement is ever involved.

Conclusions
Though the CVE programs in the UK and Saudi Arabia are each profoundly
shaped by cultural, political, and legal elements unique to its country, the challenges
faced by the Prevent strategy and the religious nature of the PRAC strategy bear useful
insights for the further implementation of the CVE programs in the U.S. Firstly, the
challenge faced by the Prevent strategy regarding the securitization of CVE programs is
an important lesson to heed. As described by Khalida Khan, a British-Muslim activist and
founder of the An-Nisa Society, an organization focused on the welfare of BritishMuslim families, “we believe that it will be more productive for the government to build
trust, and address the needs of the Muslim community in the interest of social justice,
rather than through the lens of anti-terrorism;”145 because “without the prerequisite of
trust and long established engagement, local authorities, police and others are likely to
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find suspicion and distrust [from Muslim communities] if their first encounter is about
preventing violent extremism.”146 Such distrust and suspicious will and has proven to be
counterproductive in regards to the goals of Prevent, and will likely be as well for U.S.
CVE policies. However, ways in which to effectively avoid securitization of CVE
policies while still addressing and achieving the goals of CVE have yet to be established.
Second, in regards to the effectiveness of the RICU in Prevent concerning its
work in producing and disseminating counter-narratives, it was noted that, while the
endeavor was well-placed, it failed to make an impact as much of the work done was not
thoroughly circulated. As a result, it was stated that further research was needed on how
to create powerful and specific narratives that will reach and impact the intended
audiences. This, too, is an important lesson for the U.S. to heed, as there are various
Islamic organizations actively working against militant Islamist ideology and terrorism
that could benefit from being more widely circulated.
While the U.S. does not have the ability to claim religious legitimacy in its CVE
programs as Saudi Arabia does, the way in which Saudi Arabia uses its religious
authority to implement its PRAC strategy points to the importance of Muslim
communities and Islamic organizations in the U.S. To start, the use of school writing
programs and extra-curricular activities in the prevention area of PRAC is worth
exploring, as it provides young individuals with formal, yet interactive organizations and
activities through which they can meld their Islamic and national backgrounds as
mentioned in Chapter One. Furthermore, the use of intensive religious debates in the
rehabilitation area of the strategy indicates the importance of an open, safe space through
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which individuals can discuss relevant ideas and theology under the instruction of
religious clerics.147 These debates allow individuals to discuss militant Islamist ideology
as well as become exposed to other interpretations of Islam in order to hopefully decide
against militancy.
The pilot programs of the U.S. noticeably address these lessons in one way or
another, by nominally stating the goal of engaging with communities and working with
existing efforts, including non-CVE related ones, and religious organizations; however,
in implementing these programs, it is important to keep in mind the reason for the
policies, which in this case is to empower American communities to prevent violent
extremism
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

All things considered, several clear guidelines emerge for the continuation of
CVE policy in the U.S in regards to addressing militant Islamist ideology. The
importance of Muslim communities has been repeatedly stated throughout the academic
and policy worlds; however, in light of the lessons learned in Chapter One, it can be seen
why they are significant.148 Those who are potentially at risk of radicalization are, as the
Minneapolis framework suggests, searching for their identity, for their place, in U.S.
society. They are working to successfully merge all aspects of their background—their
ethnicity, religion, nationality, family etc.—into one cohesive identity. Given the current
state of turmoil surrounding the religion of Islam and it’s followers, such an endeavor has
become increasingly more difficult over the years as different parts of their background
seem to clash. Essentially, they are working to establish what it means to be a Muslim
American, or whether the merging of those two identities is possible.149 The experiences
they have during this process will likely shape their conclusion, which, in a roundabout
way, has the potential to determine whether or not they turn towards Islamist or militant
Islamist ideologies. As demonstrated in the first chapter, militant Islamist ideology is
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readily available to fulfill an individual’s need for identity. This points to the absolute
importance of the incorporation of the Muslim community, an importance that has been
recognized in all three U.S. Pilot Programs as well as in the UK’s Prevent Program.
Earlier, it was mentioned that by looking at what militant Islamist ideology
provides its adherents, policy makers can work to develop alternative, non-violent means
by which similar notions can be achieved. Militant Islamist ideology provides individuals
with a sense of purpose, a cause to believe in, and solutions to their problems. As
Dawson described, these are the benefits individuals believe they are obtaining from
militant Islamist ideology. This simply means that these individuals need to be able to
find those values to an equal or greater degree here in the Unites States. As the
Minneapolis-St.Paul Framework lists, there is a lack of opportunity for those in danger of
becoming radicalized. Of course, there are plenty of existing social programs throughout
each state that are meant to develop and provide these benefits; however, the degree to
which they are being utilized by immigrant and Muslim communities is worth studying
and improving upon. Thus, the endeavor to provide such programs as listed in the Pilot
Programs is a step in the right direction; however, as mentioned by the Boston
Framework and demonstrated by the U.K. Prevent program, providing these programs
solely for the sake of individuals not becoming radicalized, or ‘securitizing’ them, makes
the effort disingenuous and could possibly further isolate and alienate the Muslim
community.150 Thus, this thesis agrees with the approach of the Boston Framework, in
which it is working to build off of already existing initiatives without necessarily
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associating them with CVE. In this case, it is mostly outreach efforts that need to be
aggressively pursued in order to reach and gain participation of the Muslim community in
already existing social programs meant to foster community involvement.
Law enforcement, of course, plays a crucial role in CVE and the larger counterterrorism strategy. In an even broader sense, they also play a crucial role in making
communities feel safe and defending and representing the values and laws of the United
States.151 All of these roles can and will likely have an impact on a Muslim’s pursuit to
establish their identity as a Muslim American, whether positive or negative. As all of the
CVE programs demonstrated, there are separate stages of CVE depending on the degree
to which an individual has become radicalized. Each stage merits a different response and
participation of law enforcement. Considering the role of identity, the preemptive stage of
CVE is of particular importance. This is the stage where law enforcement can, arguably,
have the most impact. The more the Muslim community sees that law enforcement is on
‘their side,’ through interacting with them and providing services and protection, the
more they are likely to feel a part of and identify with the American community. 152 An
unfortunate though somewhat understandable byproduct of the War of Terror has been an
increase in ‘Islamophobia’ and Islamophobic attacks against Muslims and Islamic
symbols. While an unfortunate situation, such events provide opportunities for law
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enforcement to protect the Muslim community, thereby conveying the message that
Muslims are protected by the United States.153
Thus, this thesis recommends the following in regards to how to effectively
address militant Islamist ideology in the implementation of US CVE policy:
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Strongly consider ways in which to make CVE efforts, particularly in
outreach and prevention, distinct from counter-terrorism efforts in order to
avoid securitizing CVE and further isolating the Muslim community.



Demonstrate consistent fairness and justice in prosecuting hate crimes in
general, and particularly against the Muslim community in order to
convey the message that U.S. law enforcement is unbiased and there to
protect them. Consider publicizing such instances in order to circulate the
image of U.S. law enforcement protecting Muslim communities.



Continue to research and pursue methods to amplify and partner with the
voices of existing Islamic organizations actively working against violent
extremism.



Continue to meet with Muslim communities and discuss ways in which to
improve CVE policies and share with them information that might help in
local, private CVE programs/efforts, such as ways in which militant
Islamist recruiters are reaching out to individuals.



Consider publicizing conjoined efforts and meetings between U.S.
government and law enforcement with Muslim communities in order to
convey the image of working with instead of working against Muslim
communities.



Allow the space for and seek to facilitate the development of Islamic
programs and institutions that work to support Muslim families and
individuals with social services. However, be wary of and continue
researching the possible effects of directly funding such programs and
activities.



Continue to pursue research projects on how to effectively implement and
measure CVE programs.

Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, 8.
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While these suggestions are not directly concerned with the development of
individual and cultural identities, they will likely help facilitate an environment in which
Muslim communities can comfortably ally with the U.S. government in CVE efforts
while developing and providing services that can help individuals develop a MuslimAmerican identity.
In the various fields associated with CVE and terrorism, there are few things that
scholars agree on. Indeed, definitions for long-standing terms such as terrorism, ideology,
and identity are by no means established. However, one thing everyone can agree on is
the complex nature of CVE and its associated concepts. There are seemingly endless
contributing factors, each worth considering and exploring for their value in the pursuit of
ending terrorism. This thesis, however, looked at CVE through the lens of identity in
order to convey its importance and utility in understanding how to best move forward in
the emerging U.S. CVE policy.
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APPENDIX
Due to the mutual rise in Islamist terrorism and the analysis thereof, a variety of
terms have been and continue to be used to describe the act and perpetrators of Islamist
terrorism. Generally speaking, these terms are often some variation or combination of
the words Islam, jihad, fundamentalist, militant, extremist, and radical. Although choice
in term usage may seem trivial, it can have broader, unintended implications if done
carelessly. As Khaled al-Fadl explains, “labels do not just describe; they also judge.”154
Using one term over another could mistakenly include people and concepts that could
otherwise be useful in fighting the ideas and people the U.S. is trying to defeat. As such,
this thesis has deliberately used the terms ‘militant Islamist’ and ‘Islamist terrorism’ in
order to convey the distinction between formal Islam and the devised ideology and its
modified definitions.
Reasoning behind this deliberate choice largely rests on reasoning provided by
Dr. Khaled Abou el-Fadl, Islamic jurist and Professor of Law at UCLA, in which he uses
a process of exclusion to choose an appropriate label in his book The Great Theft. Abou
el-Fadl disqualifies ‘fundamentalist’ due to the fact that ‘all Islamic groups and
organizations claim to adhere to the fundamentals of Islam.’155 He clarifies that using the
term to describe Christian groups that insist on the literal meaning of the scripture
“appears to be quite reasonable;” however, in the Islamic context it is not, because the
appropriate Arabic word, usuli, means “one who relies on the fundamentals or basics.”
Therefore, the expression ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ conveys the impression that only
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fundamentalists follow the basics of the faith, the Qur’an and the hadith. As such, “many
liberal, progressive, or moderate Muslims would describe themselves as usulis, or
fundamentalists, without thinking that this carries a negative connotation.”156
Abou el-Fadl also deems terms such as radical and extremist as unsuitable
because groups like the Taliban and al-Qaida are not always radical or extremist
regarding all issues, but rather absolutist. It is for this reason that Abou el-Fadl chooses to
use the term ‘puritan’ throughout his book to describe such groups; “the earmark of their
thinking is its absolutist and unequivocal quality.”157 However, this thesis has forgone the
use of ‘puritan’ due its connotation in the West to the Protestant reform movement in the
16th and 17th centuries. Thus, another, equally appropriate term was needed.
‘Militant’ is precluded on three accounts. If the term is used to mean willingness
to use force, Abou el-Fadl argues that Islam, Christianity, and Judaism all accept that the
use of force is justifiable under certain circumstances. Second, if by ‘militant’ one means
the use of offensive or aggressive force, he claims that nearly everyone claims to use
force only in self-defense. Third, if excessive force is meant by the use of ‘militant,’
Abou el-Fadl deems it unhelpful as it also applies to many factions and nations. ‘Islamist’
is also excluded because generally, it refers to Muslims that believe Islamic theology and
law should serve as an authoritative frame of reference in any social or political
condition, but “it does not necessarily mean believing in a theocratic state or imposing
draconian laws upon an innocent group of people.”158 Despite this, this thesis opts for the
combination of ‘militant’ and ‘Islamist,’ in that it sufficiently fills the gaps identified by
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Abou el-Fadl and appropriately maintains the distinction but also relation between Islam
and militant Islamist ideology. The word ‘militant’ is used to describe the use of
excessive force and as a modifier of ‘Islamist,’ thereby eliminating any vagueness that
could be used to describe other militant forces. Similarly, ‘Islamist’ is used to specify the
group of Muslims who advocate for political Islam, but the use of the modifier ‘militant’
further specifies the group of Islamists that are willing to use excessive force to achieve
their goals.
Mary Habeck provided similar reasoning in her book Knowing the Enemy,
although she ultimately chose the use of the term ‘jihadi’. In her argument against the use
of the terms ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘Islamism’, she states:
Some analysts have suggested that the attackers should be identified with
‘fundamentalism’ or ‘Islamism,’ the reforming Islam that calls for a revival of the
religion and a “return” of Islam to political power. But Islamism likewise
represents neither a unified nor uniform phenomenon. The term describes, rather,
a complex of often antagonistic groups with differing beliefs, goals, and
methodologies for attaining their ends. Some of these groups (such at Turkey’s
Justice and Development Party [the AK]) are committed to democratic processes
and to the international system. To identify parties like the AK with the terrorists
of 9/11 threatens to confuse rather than clarify the situation.159
Thus, similar to Abou el-Fadl, she disqualifies the use of Islamism due to its
vagueness. Her choice of the labels ‘jihadi’ and ‘jihadist’ is made in order to identify
their “commitment to the violent overthrow of the existing international system and its
replacement by an all-encompassing Islamic state.” This definition accurately captures
what is meant in this thesis by the term ‘militant Islamist.’ While this thesis agrees with
Habeck’s definition, it does not agree with her choice of terms due to it promoting
conflation of the Islamic and Islamist definitions of jihad.
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